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. a  !, and, after au almost unbroken era 
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urt of Dhost Mahorned, the Indian 
finances would be, at last, free to 
to the improvement of the moral and 
t populations under its rule, and by 
~l~iness,  prove Great Britain deserving i and of the high position she now 
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* S P E E C H  
OF 
THE EARL OF NORTHBROOK, 
IN TRE 
G U I L D H A L L ,  WINCHESTER,  
0 1 2  the I ~ t h  of Noz~e~~l l i e~;  1878. 
LONDON : 
N A T I O N A L  P R E S S  A G E N C Y ,  L I M I T E D ,  
106, SI-IOE LANE, FLEET STREET. 
PRICE ONE PENNY. 

AT THE GUILDHALL, WINCHESTER, 
OIL the 11th of ATocenzber, 1878. 
The HIGH SHERIFF gave '' The Houses of Parliament." 
LORTI NORTHRROOI~, in responding to the toast, said :- 
r .  o r ,  Mr. High She~iff, and gentlemen,--I beg to 
%hank you on behalf of the House of Lords for the manner 
in which you have received the toast which has just been 
proposed. Although the duties of the House of Lords 
.are not so laborious as those of the other House of 
Parliament, yet I venture to think that in discussions of 
great public questions the House of Lords has shewn itself 
r e p a l  to the occasion, and 6ns not disappointed public 
-espectation. 
On such occasions as these, members of Parlialnent 
are usually expected to perform the difficult task of 
:saying sometlling upon public affi~ks without tonching 
upon party politics. I trust, however, that . I  shall 
be able to clo this, and for this reason. The only 
p~~bl ic  affairs of which I have any special knowledge, and 
-the only public affairs ulpon which I am able to give you 
I .any information, are those connected with India. When 
i in the co~use of the last two yeus I have attendecl in 
, . -this room, to join in cloing hono~u to gentlemen who 
have filled the office of Chief Magistmte of the City of 
Winchester-and I have never attendecl with greater 
pleasure than on the present occasion-I have offered 
Lsome observations npon Indian affairs. I have been told, 
I *.even by those who do not agree with me as to home 
1 politics, that those observations of mine were of some 
interest. That being so, ancl having regwd to existing 
circumstances, I propose to make some remarks on the 
.same subject this evening; and in doing so, I beg 
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to say that I for one have never regarded Indium 
questions as party quest.ions in Parliament or elsewhere. 
The other day I was askecl to take the chair of a politicali 
meeting called to oonsicler the present state of affairs in 
India, but I cleclinecl to do so. You may rest assured,. 
therefore, Mr. Mayor oucl gentlemen, that, while I glacUy 
avail myself of this opportunity of expressing my 
opinion with regarcl t o  the clifficulty which h:ts asisen 
with Afghanistan at x meeting which has no party 
character, I shall be ~nost cautious not to say anything. 
which could interfere with the harmony of the evening. 
Probably the best thing I can do, in order to render 
clear what I have to say to you, will be t o  give s 
brief sketch of the history of ow relations with Afghanistan,. 
with which country, I am sor1.y to say, me appear to be on 
the verge of mar. 
I t  is needless to recall to your recollection' that nearly 
forty years ago nn unreasonnble fear of Russian intrigues 
in  Afghanistan led us into an ~mjnst war with, that country ; 
mlcl that, after grave disasters, the gallantry of om- army and 
the determination of our generals placed British troolx as, 
conquerors in Cabul.' I n  the year 1842, having done this, 
we retired to India. A t  that time the ruler of C&ul was 
Dost Mohammed. It vas  not loug before me became good 
friends with the gallant; enolny with whom vre had fought. 
That friendship was mainly clue to S h  John (now Lord) 
Lawrence, wlio signecl ZL treaty with Dost Mohamllled ancl 
his heirs, in which we agreed to resl~ect his territories and 
never to interfere therein, while he entered into a cone-, 
sponding ongagement with resllect t o  British territories. 
This Treaty, which still s~zbsists, was concluded in the year 
1805. We nftermnrds, cluring the Persian wax, gave him 
an annual subsidy, and the result of this policy was t h ~ t  
cluring the Indian Mutiny Dost Mohammed remaine d firm 
to his diance, and did not disturb the tranquillity of ow 
frontier. Dost Mohammed died in 1863, and for five years 
thwe were civil wars between his sons, who contended for 
the sovereignty of Afghanistan. During almost all that . 
time Sir John Lawrence, who hacl mado the treaty with 
Dost Mohammed, was Governor-General of Inclia. He 
wisely abstained from any interference in the civil mars of 
Afghanistan, only saying that whoever bccame r~iier of the. 
, , 
country would be ~ecognised as such by the Biitish Govern- 
ment. . Mayor, me hav heard a good deal lately of the 
1 
phmae 'Easterly inactivity> 
1 
' It may be interesting to you 
to I;llow mhaqthe origin of that pphrrtse was. It originated in. 
. I 
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mn article written in the Fol-tlzillht!,/ l k ~ i e t i :  in 1869, by 3 very 
able young Indian civilian, John Wyllie, who, I reg~et  to sny, 
.shortly afterwards cliecl. :'Describing the l~olicy of Xh- John 
Lawrence, he saicl that durine the civil war, Sir John 
La~mence pursued n policy of lllesterly innctivily." The 
phmse, however, in no way applied to the policy lxwsned 
since the yeu 18G8. So muoh does it not apply that Mr. 
Wyllie, who wrote the article headed " Masterly Inactivity ," 
wrote another headed " Mischievons Inactivity," in which he 
gave the seasans he lud to advance a ninst the policy 
:nfterrmcls prsued by Lord Lawrence and kord Mayo. ,'~ 
To return to our history, Shere Ali, the present Ameer 
of Alghanistnn, at length, in the yew 1868, got the upper- 
band of his brotl~ers, and then it appeased to Lord Lawrenoe, 
.and, I think, visely, that the time hacl amived when the 
British Govmnmont might enter iuto closer relations with ;. , , , 
him and snpport him in maintaining himself in the kingdom. .',.: :,; I 
That hap1)ened under a Conservative Government, when Mr. 
Disraeli was Prime Minister, and Sir Stafford Northcote was 
!Secreta-ry of State for India. It . fell, however, to Lord 
Hayo to carry ont the polioy of Lord Lawrence. Lorcl 
Mayo met Bhere Ali at Umballe in the Punjaub, in  the 
..;ll)lmg. of 1869, and held a conference with him, sun*oumded 
by all the pomp w11ich attencls such viceregal assemblrtges ; 
ancl after hearing dl that Shere Ali desired to receive from 
the British Goveinment, he clecidecl what he mould give 
him, and what he did ]lot feel it  right far the interests 
,of this couutry to give him. 
As the policy of Lord Mayo has been challenged 
.a good deal in the Press of late, I think it ollly 
,fair to hi111 to use his own words to  describe it. 
These are his worcls. He wrote on the 1st of July, 
1869 :-" While we distinctly iuti~nnted to the b e e r  
that uncler no circ~mstances should a British soldier ever 
.oross his frontier to assist him in coercing his rebellious 
subjects ; that no European officers should be placed 
,as Residents in his cities; that no fixed subsidy or 
money allomance shoull be given for any named period; 
that no p~omises of assistance in .other mays would be made ; 
,- - 
that no treaty wo~ulcl be entered into obliging us uncler ef!e~y 
aircumstance to recognise him ancl his descendants Rulers in 
Afghanistan; we wore prepared, by the most open and 
'. . :absolute present recognition, and by evaly public evidenae of 
fi<endly disposition, of respect for his character and interest 
iin his fortunes, to give a11 the moral support in our power ; 
:.and. in aclclition we were willing t o  assist him' with moIley, 
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gms, ammunition, and artificers, and in otller ways;  
we deem it possible or desirable to do so." 
There are three things in that statement which require- 
notice. First of all, Lord Mayo distinctly told the Ameer t h a t  
no European officer woulcl be placed in his territories again& 
his wish. That appears, at first sight, a great concession 
to the Ameer of Afghanistan ; but it happens that Dos t  
Mohammed, the father of Shere Ali, had the strongest con- 
-&tion of the objections against placing British officers in his. 
country. H e  said to Lord Lawrence in 185 6, " If F e  are to 
be friends, do not force British officers upon me." Dol1btless 
this was one of the reasons why Lord Mayo gave this- 
assurance to the p~eseut Ameer. It is obvious, moreover, 
that unless British officers were to be there on goocl relations 
with t,he Ruler of Afghanistan, they would be of no use- 
whatever. The Ameer, however, has, until quite recently, 
always had a K a t i ~ e  British Agent at his Court. The n e x t  
point is that there mere to be no treaties with Shere Ali- 
The t*reaties of which he woulcl have been glacl were o f  
two kinds-first, an unconclitional guarantee that me should  
defend him from attack from Nit.hout. Lord Mayo v e r y  
properly refused to give such a guarantee ; the effect of' 
it would have been to encourage Shere Ali to attack his- 
neighbours, relying on our support, and to run great risk 
of bringing us into collision v i th  them. Again, Lord Mayo- 
refused to ive a guarantee that England would support a n y  % one whom here Ali at his death might name as his hell-,- 
Dost Xohammed advised, and indeed entreated Lord Law-  
rence, in 1857, "to leave the Afghans alone to settle t h e i r  
own &sputes, to fight their omn Lattles among theuiselves,'" 
and such a guarantee would probably involve us in a n  
Afghan civil kar .  on Shere AX'S deafh. Those were the- 
priGciples upon which L o ~ d  Mayo dealt with Shere Ali in 
lSG9. 
&he arrangements made with Shere Ali, though t h e y -  
were made under a Liberal Administration, were ini t iated 
under a Conservative Administration, and received the- 
emphatic approval of Sir Staff orcl Northcote, who was 
Secretary of State for India when they were commencecl,. 
This shews, as I have said, that this is no party matter, for- 
the policy pursued was one that was carried on from Govern- 
ment to Government, and from Viceroy to Viceroy/ 
I succeeded Lord Mayo in 1872 as Governor-General 
of India, but I am not going to dmell on my o m  
conduct during the time I occupied that position. I had 
$he honour to serve ~snder the Administrations of =, 
:hat Dost 
ire shoulci 
,ttacli his. 
1s in an 
amenced.. 
1 
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.officers shoulcl not be sent into Afghanistan against the 
mishes of the Anleer,, to consider that any offonce had been 
committed against the British Government by the refusal. 
Since 1876, when I ret~uned to England, I have had no 
official knowledge of what has taken place in India. Las t  
year, I said, speaking in this hall, that I felt considerable 
apprehensions with regard to our policy in relation to 
Afghanistan, but I also stated that those apprehensions were 
to rs great extent removed by the assurances given in Parlia- 
ment in 1877 by 'ord Salisbury and Sir Stafford 3Torthcote. 
Bevertheless, I am bound to say that my apprehensions still 
"exist that there has been a change of policy since the year 1876. 
I know that negotiations with the Ameer took place early in 
1877, and that the Native Agent of the British Government 
was afterwards withdrawn from the Cou t  of the Ameer- 
There are other circumstances which seem to me, in default 
of further information, not to be altogether consistent with 
the assurances given to Parliament in 1877. This, however, 
is a question which cannot be discussed here, nor until the 
whole information on this subject is given to Parliament. ' 
Such, then, was the state of affairs when the present 
difficulty with Afghanistan arose. I neod not dwell a t  
length on the circumstances which led to the critical state 
of affairs which now exists. On the 13th of August we 
heard that a Russian Mission had arrived at Cabul on the  
22nd of July preceding, and that t8he Government had de- 
termined, in consequence, to send a British Mission to 
the Ameer, The Viceroy addressed letters to the Ameer, 
which arrived at Cabul on the 10th of September, request- 
ing him to receive the British Mission. The Mission, 
however, was sent forward before the Ameer's answer 
was received. On the 21 st of September, the officers of the 
b e e r  in the Ehyber Pass refused to allow the Mission to . 
proceed. It was said in the first telegraphic accounts that  
a gross insult had been offered to the Britlsh officer who went 
up the Khyber in advance of the Mission. But I am glad 
that subsequent accounts have disabused us of any such idea, 
and that the conduct of the officer of the Ameer in the 
Ehyber was perfectly civil. H e  simply said that he had no 
orders to allow the Mission to  pass, and asked that it shoulcl 
wait until he should receive instructions from his master. 
!l'he Mission was then broken up, and a British force was 
massed upon the frontiers of Afghanistan. The native Envoy 
who was sent with the Viceroy's letters, returned with the 
Ameer's reply to Simla on the 26th of October. It seemed to 
the Government to be right under the circumstances that a n  
re la t ion  to  
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I e year 1876. 
ace e d y  in 
e, in default 
Isistent wi th  
kis, however, 
b r  until the .  I Par l iament .  ' 1 the present 
tot dwel l  a t  
t i c  state 
A u g - ~ ~ s t  we 
pabul on the  
k cers of the  Mission 60 
:counts t h a t  I 
er who went 
; I am glad  * 
y such idea, 
meer in the  
t t  he had no . 
lilt it should 
his master. 
L force  was I 
ative Envoy 
~ e d  with the 
It seemed to I i
lees t h a t  an I 
dtimat~zm should be adclressecl to the Ameer ; it was 
delivered on the 2nd of Korember into his officer's hands on 
the  frontier, and we are informed that if he ~ j e c t s  the 
zdtimaturn, hostilities will colnzllence on the 20th of t<he 
present month. 
Many pe~ple have asked me what I think upon the 
matter-whether I think we ought to go to war or not, and 
whether I think we have a just cause of wax or not. All 
-that I can say nov is that i t  is utterly impossible for me to ; give any answer to these questions, because I do not know 
what instructions mere given to the Mission, I do not h o w  
what answer Shere Ali has given to the Viceroy, and I do 
not know the terms of the ultimatum. Under these circum- 
-stances 1 can give no opinion whether the cause of was, if we 
haw a war, is a just one, or whether we ought or ought not 
to go to war. 
But, although I can give no such opinion for want of 
l ~ ~ f f i c i e n t  i formation, there are some questions connectecl 
with what has occurred upon which I may say n. few words. 
h d  first upon the conduct of Russia in this matter. I am 
perfectly aware of what has taken place between the Russian 
rGovernmellt and the British Government with regard to 
Afghanistan U ~ J  to the year 1874. There is no secret about 
it ; the papers have been laid before Parliament. What has 
happened is this-the Russian Governinent agreed with US 
a s  to the frontier of Afghanistan. They agreed with us 
that they would use what influence they could with the 
Native States on their side of the frontier to hinder those 
SJtates from attacking Afghauistan, and we agreed to use our 
influence to prevent Afghanistan &om attacking the Native 
States on the Russian side of the frontier. The Russian GO- 
~ernment  did one thing more. On several occasions, in the 
alearest possible terms, they told us that Afghanistan was 
beyond the sphere of their proceedings in Central Asia. I am 
bound to say that up to the time when I left India, they, 
-to the best of my belief, had adhered to their engagements. 
At that time one of the disappointed members of the family of 
.Dost Mohammed lived in a city under nussian protection. 
That man was never allowed to give any trouble iu 
Afghanistan. On other occasions the Russian Government 
.shewed that they in no way desired to depart from their 
ben$agements in the matter. - ,  
i It would appear, howqvq at first sight that by sending 
3 Mission to Uabul, they' hacl distinctly broken the 
+engagements they had made; but must be fair 
in the matter, and we m s t  recollect that in the spring 
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of the year we were on the brink of a mar with Russia. 
It was supposed that Russia woxdd not submit the t e rns  of 
the 9an Stefan0 Treaty to the discussion of the European 
Powers concerned. TVe all h o w  that the British Govern-- 
ment took a decided line against Russia assuming such a n  . 
attitude. We sent Native Inclian troops to Malta, ancl, in 
~ o i n t  of fact, the question of peace or war h ~ m g  at that time- 
on n thread, For my own part I do not hesitate to say 
that if we hacl the right-as I llold that me hacl the right- 
to send Native Indian troops to Unlta, and to take other- 
measures to 13repare for a war with Russia, the Russinlls had 
the right totah such steps as they thought necessary to. 
protect Rnssian interests in Asia. This is the explanation I 
give, and which I conceive to be the natural esplanation, of '  
the movement of troops in the spring of this year from 
Russian Turkestan towards the Osus, ancl the sending of the  
Russian Mission to Afghanistan/ 
I have seen it mentionecl in the newspapers that this 
/Mission was sent after the signature of the Treaty of '  
,Berlin on the 13th of July, ancl that this is a. 
proof cf the animosity of the Russian Government, 
towards us. That statement can, a t  any rate, be 
easily clisposecl of. The Russian Mission arrived 
' at Cabul on the 22ncl of July. The clistance from 
Samarcand to Cab~11 being more than six hundred miles, it 
could not haye been possible for the Russian Eission to. 
accomplish it in much less than a month. It is therefore- 
> impossible that a Mission starting on the 13th of July could 
have arrived a t  Co,bul on the 22nd of July. 
It  seems to me, with regard to the conduct of lZussia 
in this matter, that the Government of this country 
had a right, peace being assured, to enter into a diploma- 
tic coi~espondence with Russia for the purpose of'  
asking what were her intentions, ancl whether she w o d d  
adhere to the fomer arrangement with respect to abstention 
from interference with Afghanistan, or what her fi~ture pol+ 
was to be. This the Governuent had a perfect right to do, and. 
my own impression is that that is the course Tyhich the. 
Government bas p~rrsued. We clo not know at present what 
has been done ; papers mere promised the clay before Parlia-- 
ment separatecl, and I presume that those papers will soon 
be producecl. 
So far, then, as to the conduct of Russia. Now as regards. . 
that of the Amoer of Afghanistan. Supposing that Shere A l i  
had, when I ~vas Governor-General of India, received a, 
Xussinn Mission at Cab111 without first consulting the Br i t i sh  
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Government as to vhether it shoulcl be received, 1 shoulcl 
]lave said tllat i t  mould have been an unfriendly act7 in con- 
seqllence of our pre.irious comm~~nications .with him. &lt'\~--e 
mus t  look at  the ci~cumstances which went before the case. 
as it has actual.l?y arisen. It vas  impossible for the Alneer 
t o  conu.nunicate with the British Government, fol; or 
~~ r rong lg~ ,  our Native Agent at his Co1u.t haclbeen ~v i t hd rawi~  
w e  horn ,  however, that 11e tried to prevent the Russiau 
Mission going to Cabul. That has appeared several times in $he 
col~espondence fronl Inclia, and I believe it to be the fact. -We 
cannot possibly have any evidence that the Ameer bas entered 
in to  any hostile arrangement with the Eussian Mission. I 
have no fear of Russian intrigue in Afghanistan. From 3111 
- t h a t  I linotv or have ever hearcl of that country the real 
feeling of the b e e r  of Cab111 and of the people of Afghan- 
istan is a clesire to maintain their independence, and n 
clislike of any interference, either by England or liussia, in  
their affairs ; ancl I will say this much, that, to the best of 
my belief, when I left India, the Amee~,  though he would 
have clisliked any interference on the p:~rt of England, would 
have resented any sucll interference on the p u t  of Russia 9, 
far greater estent? I n  my opinion the presence of rLussians 
in Afghanistan vould only arouse the feeling of independence. 
there, ancl the longer they remained the less influence they 1 
wo~l ld  have. 
But  ~vhen me consider the conduct of Shere Ali in this  
inatter I confess that I have observed with the greatest 
regret opinions ~vhich have been expressed in the Press wit11 
regard to the manner in which we sho~~lcl treat h h ,  because. 
due  consideration has not been given to his position and his 
rights ; and what I regret Inore is that Sir Fitzjames Stephen,' 
*The ol~inions of Sir Fitajanies Stephen to which I referred mill b e  
fouiicl in his letter to the Tiazes of the 24th of October. On the 
9 th  of Nove~l~ber he adclressecl another letter to the Tilrtes, more fully 
explaining the meaning of his fint letter. I regret that lfis second 
letter was not publishecl until after I spoke, and tllat I m s  therefore 
uiable  to notice it togethcr with his origilial letter. 
Sir Fitzjsmes Stephen has since published a letter in tile Tb~es ,  
ooml~lc~t i l~g upon 1117 observations wit11 rcsl~ect to first letter- 
There are some t r a l l g  inaccuracies in the passages quoted b~ Sir 
Pitzjalnes Stephen, who bad only access to the telegraphic rePo* of 
m y  speech ; these I have nov correcteci. 
1 
I Wllatever my opinion may be of the arg~1111ents ~ l c c l l  Sir Fitz- janles Stephen has nsecl in his ~ I T O  last letters, I have pleasure 
in taking this opportunity of ex1)ressing illy cordial concurrence xfith 
t h e  conclusion of his last letter, i n  which be ~~'rites, quotkllg froll1 
speecll lllade by ~yheii ill India, " the real foundation of our 
Tower be folllld to be an inflexible adl~erence to the bruall 
-a highly distinguished Liberal lawyer, has laid down doc- 
trines on this subject in which I can in no way agree. Sir 
Fitzjmes Stephen has contended that the principles of 
international law have no reference to om dealings with 
. Shere Ali. He  says that " there is no law by which the case 
between Xhere Bli and o~vselves can be tried. We are 
exceedingly powerful anc2 highly civilised ; he is cornpara- 
..tively weak and half barbarous. H e  cannot be permitted to 
follow a course of policy which may expose us to danger. 
We are to be the judges of the cause, and we are to decide 
.according to our o m  interests." I have given you L3.r Fitz- 
- james Stephen's own words, as I do not wish to Inisrepresent 
him. Where does the doctrine he lays down carry us ? It 
goes this length, that any nation, any civilisecl nation it 
must be, in dealing with another weak nation, and one which 
the strong nation conceives to be uncivilised, may act on no 
lother principle than that might is right. This principle 
would justify the partition of Poland, and would justify 
every act, of Eussia against which this country has been 
crying out for some time. I feel sure that Sir Fitzjames 
&,Stephen could not have sufficiently considered the meaning 
of what he has saicl, and that such a doctrine as this must 
.shock the moral sense of all right feeling people of this 
3countr~r. 
But I am satisfied that the doctrine itself is funds- 
-mentally unsound. S~ Fitzjames Stephen Eeems to m e  
--to have confused the conventional law of nations-that 
.is to say, that part of the law of nations which depends 
o n  the practice of European States, and which is not 
applicable in all respects to Asiatic States,-with the 
main principles of international law by which great 
-questions such as whether a war is justifiable or not are 
to be tried. These main principles of international law are 
founded upon the first princil3les of morals, and are derived 
from what Bacon calls the cc  fountains of justice," which have 
.been recognised not only by Christian lawyers and states- 
men, but by heathen lawyers and statesmen from times long 
(past. Some present may relnember an eloquent passage 
a,princil)les of justice, colmilon to all persons, i.11 all cou~l t ies  anci a l l  
ages, and enforced with unflinclling firl~~ness for or against everyone 
who claims their benefits or who presun~es to violate them, no matter 
vho he may be." These vords express, he says, his most earnest ancl 
.abiding convictions about India. They apply, in 1Gs opinion as well as 
,iq mine, to Native States in and adjoining to Inclia just as much as to  
indi~riduals. "If possible," he adds, " their application to such 
States is even more important than their application to incliviclut~ls." 
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of Cicero on the subject which I may be alloaed to para~,i~rase. 
thus :-These foundations of law are confined to no time and 
to no place. They cannot be abrogated by Act of Parliament 
or by the popular opinion of the day. They were as binding 
on Borne as they are now on England, and they are of as 
equal force at Cabul as they were at Berlin. 
- 
This new doctrine, moreover, is as iml~olitic as it is 
unsound. " Justice," says Sir James Macintosh, L L  is the. 
paramount interest of all men and of all comm&ities ; 7 7  and 
such doctrines as those propounded by Sir Fitzjames Stephen 
are not only dangerous anywhere, but especially so in 
India. We have to deal in India with Native States 
which, although independent, are undoubteclly weal<, and 
seine of them not highly civilised. We have nlso to deal 
with Native States which are not altogether independent,. 
but which possess liinited sovereign rights-limited by 
treaty engagements with this country and by usages which 
have descended from the time when theEmperors of D e E  held 
sway in Hindostan. To all these States the Queen's Pro- 
elmation on assuming direct sovereignty in Inclia was 
issued, on November lst, 1858. I remember me11 having 
been magnificently entertainecl in this hall, Mr. Mayor, 
before I left England for India, by one of your- 
predecessors-I wish he were among us now-and 
having surprised some of my friends by reading o large 
portion of that Proclamation. Let me read again a few 
words from it. Her Majesty said:-" We hereby announce 
to the Native Princes of India that all the treaties and 
engagements made with them, by or under the authority of 
the East India Company, are by Us accepted and will be, 
scrupulously maintained, ancl. We look for the likeobservance 
on their part. We desire no extension of Our present territorial 
possessions, and while We will permit no aggression upon Our. 
dominions or Our rights t o  be attempted with impunity, We 
shall sanction no encroachments of those oE others. We-  
shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of Native 
princes as Om own." If we are to su~bstitute the doctrines. 
which I have endeavoured to combat for the great principles of 
justice in our dealings with Native States, we shall cast all 
0~1r treaties to the ~ n d s ,  and discontent and suspicion mill{ 
soon take the place of loyalty and confidence in the hearts of 
the Native Princes of India. As one who has held one of 
the highest offices under the Crown in one of the most splendid 
possessions of the Cronm, I am bound to protest against any 
such doctrines as these, and I nm certain that if ever they 
-should be prol~ounded in Parliament they will be met with 
:a11 indignant rel~u&ation Her Majesty's Ministers. 
There is one other matter of some importance upon wlicll 
I should like t o  say a few words. Nobocly could have been 
mgre pleased than I was to read that Lord Beaconsfield, in his 
speech on Saturday at the Mansion House, declared that .te 
did not believe in the danger of n Russian invasion of India. 
He alluded, however, to the necessity of some rectification 
,of our North-Western frontier. The particular rectification 
which Her Majesty's Ministers consider to be necessary was 
not specified; and, therefore, I think that I can mitli- 
out any impropriety contribute something to the information 
rnhich is now before tlie public on this question, which 
I am sure cannot be construecl to be one which touches 
upon party politics. The rectification of the North- 
Western frontier of India may possibly, and, indeed, 
]lot improbably, be confinecl to the permanent occupa- 
tion of Quettst, a post in the territory of the Khan of Khelat, 
on the other side of the Bolan Pass from India. Upon this 
I wish to say that the responsibility of the measures tdcen in 
the year IS76 for the settlement of some difficulties which 
had arisen between the Khan of Khelat and his nobles rests 
upon me. It is fair t o  say that I I d  not contemplate in 
that arrangement the occupation of Quetta, and, indeed, I 
expressed my opinion in the House of Lords last year 
against that measure. However, the occupation of Quettn 
has taken place. The political importance of the situation is 
undoubted. The tribes in the neighbourhood are not 
unfriendly to us, and reasons may noiv exist for ra permanent 
locc~~pation of the post. 
BLI~ other suggestions have been made for the recti- 
fication of the North-Western frontier with which I 
entirely disagree. Sir Henry Havelock, an officer of 
distinguishecl service himself, bearing a still more clis- 
tinguished name, and also a Liberal inember of Parlia- 
ment, has recomlllencled that we should abandon our present 
position at Peshawur, aud aclvance to the other side of the 
Khyber Pass. I have seen other recolnmendations in the 
Press that we should take 1111 a position still further in advance, 
that me should dominate the range of mountains which is 
called the Hindoo Koosll; and it is said that high military 
authorities consider our position as not safe until we can 
c ~ ~ ~ a n c l  the other side of our present mountain frontier. 
I believe that in making these suggestions the size of the 
country concerned, and the nature of its people, ]lave been 
lost sight of. Any one who has looked at a map with regard 
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The AfShnn Question. 
-riot only to the distances, but t o  the iuountaiu rzliges of 
afghanistan, a count(ry far larger than Swits~rlend, w o d d  
see that if this military opinion be a so~~ncl one, we cnunot 
stop until our outposts are on the otlier side of the Hind00 
~ o o s h ,  and until tho whole of Afgllanistm is xritKn our 
military control. I n  my opinion our present frontier is 
unassailable for purposes of defence, and to sclv&nce 
into Afghanistan woulcl be most ~uiwise. Tlle great 
difficulty which me haye hitherto had with respect to our 
frontier is in dealing with the iildel~endent tribes adjoining 
it. If we advance f~nrtlier we shall have to deal with other 
tribes, n.nd we sllnll have the same difficulty occurring over 
again. The clearest notion that I can g i ~ e  of the difficulty 
that we shall have is the trouble that me h a ~ e  already 
experiencecl in secuiing our communication between Peshawur 
and ICohd, a very short distance, through the territory of 
one only of these tribes. Just as I left India this tiibe va s  
requested to improve the cominunicntion, and the result m s  
tha t  they resisted, and in the end it  required an e~~ec l i t i on  
of sumo 5,000 men ; and although the expedition mas 
admirably conductecl, it took more than a ye&r to bring this 
small tribe to submission. 
The Prime IIinister said the other night that (' t l ~ e  
attention of Viceroys ancl of Go~~ernnlents in India and in 
England has for a long time been directed to the question of 
the  North-Western frontier of om Inclinn empire." It was ]lot, 
however, considered in my time. My military advisers- 
Lord Nspier of Magdaln, and iSir Henry Norman, second to 
none in  knowledge and experience-never '@ought to the 
notice of the Governliient of India that our frontier required 
rectification, ciuring the four gears I passed in India. I 
h m e  the. highest authority for saying that during the 
Administration of Lord Mayo no such consicierittions mere 
brought forward ; Is~lt in the years 1867 n~id 1865, under 
Lord Lawrence's Administration, the question was fully 
considered on more tban one occasion. It n~o-~ild conduce 
very much to a thorough understanding of the niatter if  the 
opinions the11 given by Sir William Mr~nsfield, Sir Henry 
Dnrand, ancl other high nutboritiee, coulcl now be made 
public. The conclusions of the Government of India at the 
time were given in these words :-" We object to any inter- 
ference in the affairs of Mghanistan by a forcible or amicable 
occupation of any post or tract in the country beyond o u r  
own frontier, inasmuch as nre think such a memure would, 
uncler present circumstances, engender irritation, defiance, 
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and hatrecl in the minds of Afghans, without in the least 
strengthening our power either for attack or defence." 
I n  conclusion, I trust that there will be no occasion for. 
mar with Afghanistan ; and I ail1 convinced that this 1nus-b 
1 be the sincere desire even of those who wish for a rectification 
of our frontier. No one can be so nnreasonczble as to wish, 
to rectify OLU frontier by means of n war which m u s t  
alienate from us the people iu whose country our estencled, 
military frontier would lie. 
There is, I am happy to say, Mr. Mayor, one bright spo t  
in the present position of affairs. I allude to the spirit 
which has been rnanifestecl by the army in India. We know 
well what the feeling of the British army is ~vheneves 
the honour and dignity of the Crown al~pear to be involved, 
but we have recently had the satisfaction of seeing the h i g h  
spirit displayed by the Native army of India. The clleer- 
fulness with which they obeyecl the order to embark f o r  
Malta, and the enthusiasm with which they have responded 
to the call on this occasion, merits all praise, and not l e s s  
satisfactory is the spirit which has been manifested by the 
Native Princes of India. The war, if therc is to be a w i ~ ~ ~  
will doubtless be very costly. The cost of the last Afghan 
war was &17,000,000. The cost of the nest war must b e  
borne by this country. India, especially after the recent 
famine, is too poor to bear it. This consiclerntion, however, 
although not altogether unimportant in the present condition 
of trade in this country, is of minor consequence compared 
with the question whether the war is just, and whether it is 
necessary, and upon these two most essential questions, I a m  
sorry to  say, it is quite inpossible for me, in  the present 
state of the information before the public, to pronounce a, 
decided or positive opinion. 
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